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Byron: A Progressive Mind

A PROGRESSIVE MIND: LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE
ORIGINS OF FREE SPEECH
Elizabeth Todd Byron

For a law review audience, I want to stress that the research
presented in this article is historical in argument first and foremost.
Understanding the historical context of the post-World War I era is
crucial to understanding Louis D. Brandeis’ emerging First
Amendment jurisprudence. He was a prominent intellectual minority
of the early 1900s who grasped the importance of protecting the
fundamental right of free speech in a political democracy for
minorities and the general political culture.
Historical context explains the climate and norms for each
time period. For example, the first line of the United States
Constitution reads “We the People of the United States.”1 In 1789,
who did “We the People” include? It meant white, educated males
who owned property, belonged to the church, and were over twentyone years of age.2 It did not include the bulk of African Americans,
who would not be guaranteed the full protections of the United States
Constitution until the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in
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1 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2 Ed
Crews,
Voting
in
Early
America,
COLONIAL
WILLIAMSBURG,
http://www.history.org/Foundation/journal/Spring07/elections.cfm (last visited Nov. 18,
2016) (explaining the voting rules in Colonial Williamsburg); see also Steven Mintz,
Winning the Vote: A History of Voting Rights, THE GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HIST.,
https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/government-and-civics/essays/winning-votehistory-voting-rights (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (explaining that the Constitution originally
left the issue of voting rights to the states).
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1868.3 It did not include women, who would not be granted suffrage
until the states ratified the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.4 It also
did not include Native Americans, who would not receive United
States citizenship until 1924.5 In 2016, who does “We the People”
include? Over time, the concept of “We the People” has evolved
expanding the rights of the United States Constitution to a broader set
of people.
A second example of the importance of historical context can
be seen in the changing meaning of the term, progressive. During the
time period of United States history that is considered to be the actual
Progressive Era, from the late 1890s through the 1910s, the
progressives pushed for anti-monopoly legislation; child labor laws;
voter reform; structural changes, such as the recall and referendum;
and municipal improvements.6 Securing the vote for women and
desegregating society did not fit into this particular progressive era.7
Fast-forward 100 years; what is a progressive today? In the 2016
presidential campaign, each candidate would give a separate
definition of what being a progressive entails.8 The point is that the
historical context of the 2010s varies greatly from that of the 1910s,
where this First Amendment story begins.9
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; This Day in History: 14th Amendment Adopted, HISTORY,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/14th-amendment-adopted (last visited Dec. 23,
2016).
4
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; This Day in History: 19th Amendment Adopted, HISTORY,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/19th-amendment-adopted (last visited Dec. 23,
2016).
5 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012); This Day in History: The Indian Citizenship Act, HISTORY,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-indian-citizenship-act (last visited Dec. 23,
2016).
6 Henry J. Sage, The Progressive Era: The Great Age of Reform, SAGE AM. HIST.
http://sageamericanhistory.net/progressive/topics/progressive.html (last updated Dec. 13,
2013); see generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R.
(8th ed. 1955); ARTHUR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1910-1917
(Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1954).
7 Femi Lewis, African-Americans in the Progressive Era, ABOUT EDUCATION,
http://afroamhistory.about.com/od/segregation/p/African-Americans-In-The-ProgressiveEra.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2016); see generally CHRISTINE LUNARDINI, FROM EQUAL
SUFFRAGE TO EQUAL RIGHTS: ALICE PAUL AND THE NATIONAL WOMAN’S PARTY, 1910-1928
(1986).
8 Nicole Gaudiano, Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders Battle Over the Meaning of
‘Progressive,’
USA
TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/02/03/new-hampshire-votersquestion-clinton-sanders-town-hall/79751570/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2016).
9 See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (5th ed.
1941).
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When the United States entered World War I in April 1917,
Americans had a limited sense of civil liberties, even by their
standards.10 That limited scope can be seen dating back to the
beginnings of the United States. In 1798, only seven years after the
Bill of Rights were ratified, Congress enacted, and President John
Adams signed, the Alien and Sedition Acts to suppress the dissenting
opinions of Jeffersonians during the war with France.11 In response,
a group of state legislators created the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions to strike back at the acts; however, no judicial remedy
existed to deem the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional.12 The
absence of protections for free political speech continued through the
Civil War and Reconstruction period, during which time the freedom
of speech was suppressed both in the Southern states and by the
Lincoln administration in the North and Midwest.13 A “civil liberties
consciousness” was limited due to the fact that the Federal Bill of
Rights only applied to the federal government.14 States and localities
dealt with rights, if they dealt with them at all.15 No culture of rights
consciousness existed.16 The concept of the federal judiciary
applying the Federal Bill of Rights against the states and individuals
within the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a process called incorporation, would not be completed
until the “rights revolution” by the Warren Court in the 1960s.17

10 Civil
Liberties
in
Wartime,
SHAREAMERICA
(Apr.
6,
2015),
https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/.
11 Alien and Sedition Acts: Defining American Freedom, CONST. RTS. FOUND.,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Alien.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
12 Virginia
Resolution – Alien and Sedition Acts, THE AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virres.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2016); Kentucky
Resolutions
–
Alien
and
Sedition
Acts,
THE
AVALON
PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/kenres.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2016); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (holding, for the first time, that “[t]he judicial
power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution” and the
Supreme Court is bound to decide cases according to the Constitution rather than the
conflicting law).
13 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 955,
971-72 n.144 (1912).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
15 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 at 67-68, 70 (1872).
16 Id. at 52, 67-68, 70
17 Steven J. Wermiel, Rights in the Modern Era: Applying the Bill of Rights to the States,
1 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 121, 128 (1992) (“[C]ase after case comes to the court which
finds the individual battling to vindicate a claim under the Bill of Rights against the powers
of government, federal and state.”).
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Therefore, during the total war effort of World War I, the
United States government enacted the Espionage Act of 1917 and
Sedition Act of 1918, which prohibited Americans from speaking out
against the draft, military action, and/or the United States
government.18 In doing so, Congress empowered the Attorney
General to arrest radicals who protested any aspect of the war
effort.19 Public opinion overwhelmingly supported these policies
because the public viewed the policies as reasonable protective
measures during wartime.20 Following the war, the Supreme Court
heard numerous cases arising from these war policies.21 Louis D.
Brandeis played a key role in shaping the eventual jurisprudence for
the freedom of speech in the United States through his judicial
opinions in the cases Abrams v. United States,22 in which he
concurred with the dissenting opinion, Gilbert v. State of
Minnesota,23 in which he wrote the dissenting opinions, and Whitney
v. California,24 in which he wrote the concurring opinion.
The case that set the stage for free speech jurisprudence post
World War I was Schenck v. United States.25 Charles Schenck was
arrested and convicted for printing and mailing leaflets that were
deemed to incite anti-war action; specifically, he urged men to resist
the draft.26 His lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, contending that the First Amendment protected the

18

Sedition Act of 1918. Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (repealed 1921);
Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 794 (1996)).
19 Home Front, War Front: Sewanee and Fort Oglethorpe in World War I: Espionage &
Sedition
Acts,
SEWANEE
U.
OF
THE
SOUTH,
http://library.sewanee.edu/c.php?g=118671&p=773219 (last updated Dec. 8, 2015).
20 Chafee, supra note 13, at 960 (explaining that “speech should be unrestricted” during
wartime “unless it is clearly liable to cause direct and dangerous interference” with the war).
21 See Steven M. Feldman, Free Speech, World War I, and Republican Democracy: The
Internal and External Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 192, 207 (2008).
22 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
23 254 U.S. 325, 336 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining that some rights are
guaranteed protection by the federal government and the statute in question was infringing
on those rights).
24 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring) (“[T]he due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of
procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by
the federal Constitution from invasion by the states. The right of free speech, the right to
teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.”).
25 249 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1919).
26 Id. at 49.
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distribution of the circulars.27 On March 3, 1919, the Supreme Court
upheld Schenck’s conviction and affirmed the judgments of the lower
courts in a unanimous vote.28 Associate Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. wrote the opinion for the Court.29 In assessing the claim
of the First Amendment right in print materials, Holmes declared that
the privilege was limited when there was a “clear and present danger”
in the speech or print.30 Holmes applied the “question of proximity”
criminal law standard to the Schenck case by doing a thorough
analysis of the leaflet.31 Specific quotes that Holmes referred to in
the leaflet included, “ ‘Assert Your Rights.’ . . . ‘your right to assert
your opposition to the draft,’ . . . ‘If you do not assert and support
your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the
solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to
retain.’ ”32 In the opinion of the Supreme Court, these statements not
only expressed the views of the Socialists, but these statements called
on American citizens to act directly.33 By sending the leaflets to
drafted men, the Supreme Court could find no other intention for the
flyer than calling on these men to refuse the draft and stay home in
violation of the Sedition Act.34
However, while Holmes emphasized that such a leaflet would
not be ruled unconstitutional in peace times, he insisted:
[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.
It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering
words that may have all the effect of force.35
Thus, even out of wartime, Holmes deemed any speech that
put others in danger was not protected under the First Amendment.36
Notice that Holmes did not say a crowded theatre; indeed, he
believed that even if one person was endangered as a result of

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 51.
Id. at 48, 53.
Id. at 48.
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 52-53.
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (citations omitted).
Id.
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someone else’s speech then the Court would rule it unconstitutional.37
The fact that his opinion went beyond war times to peacetime
examples, such as someone shouting fire in a theater, set an important
precedent for the Supreme Court in ruling on the freedom of speech
in the following years and decades.
The Supreme Court applied the clear and present danger test
to several cases following the Schenck case, including Frohwerk v.
United States38 and Debs v. United States.39 In hindsight, both
Associate Justices Holmes and Brandeis vocalized regret in their
initial rulings on freedom of speech cases coming out of World War
I.40 In a letter to Harvard Law Professor Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis
exclaimed, “I have never been quite happy about my concurrence in
the Debs and Schenck cases. I had not then thought the issues of
freedom of speech out. I thought at the subject, not through it.”41
Fortunately the Abrams case argued later that year allowed Brandeis
and Holmes a fresh opportunity, a second bite at the judicial apple, to
reexamine the issue of the freedom of speech and the First
Amendment even in wartime.42
A major difference between the Abrams and Schenck cases
was that Jacob Abrams, Mollie Steimer, Hyman Lachowsky, Samuel
Lipman, and Jacob Schwartz were Russian immigrants in the United
States, whereas Charles Schenck was an American citizen.43 As
young Russian and Jewish immigrants, they all found jobs in
factories under working class conditions from 1908-1913.44
Unsatisfied with their position in America, they began to join
together with other frustrated workers to create an anarchist
organization to fight against government regulations and poor
working conditions.45 Their organization became politicized due to

37 Id. (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”).
38 249 U.S. 204, 207-08 (1919).
39 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919).
40 Id. at 216; Frohwek, 249 U.S. at 208-09.
41 Stephen A Smith, Schenck v. United States and Abrams v. United States, in FREE
SPEECH ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS 20, 26 (Richard A. Parker ed., 2003).
42 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 619.
43 RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
FREE SPEECH 4 (1987).
44 Id. at 4, 11.
45 Id. at 22, 23.
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the Russian Revolution of 1917.46 These anarchists longed for
political change in Russia.47 In order to publicize their opposition to
the American intervention in the Russia Revolution, Abrams and the
others wrote and distributed two leaflets.48 The police arrested the
anarchists and took them to federal court where they were found
guilty of violating the Espionage Act.49 When their lawyers appealed
their case to the United States Supreme Court, the justices affirmed
the lower court ruling in a vote of 7-2.50 After having decided
Schenck just a few months before, the Supreme Court went into this
case with the judicial doctrine of the clear and present danger test.51
Associate Justice John H. Clark wrote the majority opinion declaring
that sufficient evidence established the defendants’ guilt.52
However, Holmes dissented in Abrams with the support of
Brandeis; he dissented from the doctrine he had crafted earlier that
same year in Schenck.53
Holmes stated “the United States
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to
produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about
forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States
constitutionally may seek to prevent.”54 In constructing such a rule,
Holmes dissented from his previous opinion of Schenck by modifying
the broad clear and present danger standard rule into the much
narrower “imminently threaten” doctrine.55 Holmes and Brandeis
referred to the postscript on the first leaflet that contended that the
Russian authors were not trying to support the Germans. 56 The
postscript read, “It is absurd to call us pro-German. We hate and
despise German militarism more than do you hypocritical tyrants.”57
Holmes and Brandeis pointed out that the postscript constituted clear
evidence that the defendants were not trying to interfere with the

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 26.
Id.
POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 49-52.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616-17.
Id. at 624, 631.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616, 624.
Id. at 624, 626, 628-31(Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 627, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 625 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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United States’ war with Germany.58 The defendants only sought to
raise awareness of the situation in Russia.59
Louis Brandeis spent the nine months between the Schenck
and Abrams cases doing what he did best, reviewing the facts and
examining the constitutional right of freedom of speech through a
progressive lens.60 In response to Holmes’s dissenting opinion,
Brandeis stated, “I join you heartily & gratefully.”61 Yet, while the
Abrams case allowed Brandeis to think through the freedom of
speech more methodically, it would not be until 1920 that Brandeis
wrote his own judicial opinion on the matter.62 In 1923, Brandeis
sent Felix Frankfurter a letter about the Supreme Court rulings on
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, in which he explained, “Of course you
must also remember that when Holmes writes, he doesn’t give a
fellow a chance—he shoots so quickly.”63 Thus, while Brandeis
concurred with Holmes in judicial opinions on freedom of speech
cases in 1919, he sought to explain himself on the matter.64 In 1920,
he had the chance to do so.
On August 18, 1917, a state jury convicted Joseph Gilbert,
manager of the Non-partisan League, of violating a Minnesota statute
that prohibited the obstructing or opposing of men enlisting in the
United States military.65 The Minnesota statute was enacted on April
20, 1917, prior to the Federal Selective Service Act and the Federal
Espionage Act, both of which were passed later that year.66 At a
public meeting, Gilbert argued:
We are going over to Europe to make the world
safe for democracy, but I tell you we had better make
America safe for democracy first. . . . If this is such a
great democracy, for Heaven’s sake why should we
not vote on conscription of men. We were stampeded

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 628-29 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 619-22 (majority opinion).
POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 265-66.
POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 236.
Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334, 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 266.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627-28, 630-31; POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 266.
Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 326-27, 334.
POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 269.
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into this war by newspaper rot to pull England’s
chestnuts out of the fire for her.67
On December 13, 1920, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in a vote of 7-2.68
Associate Justice Joseph McKenna wrote the opinion for the
majority.69 The majority of the Supreme Court held that all states had
the authority to enforce “police power to preserve the peace of the
State.”70 The Minnesota statute did not hinder the war effort.71 In
fact, it helped to stifle speech that obstructed the United States during
the war.72
Chief Justice Edward White dissented from the majority
opinion because he believed that “the subject-matter is within the
exclusive legislative power of Congress, when exerted, and that the
action of Congress has occupied the whole field.”73 White contended
that the issue of obstructing enlistment fell under the jurisdiction of
the Federal United States Congress.74 He believed that the Espionage
Act of 1918 took priority over any state statute, including the
Minnesota statute that the jury convicted Gilbert of violating.75 In
contradiction to Holmes, White wrote that national supremacy
controlled in this case, not states’ rights.76 White made no reference
to the freedom of speech argument in his brief dissent.77
While also dissenting, Brandeis did not vote against Gilbert’s
conviction for the same reasons as White. Brandeis explained that
although the Minnesota statute was technically implemented during
the war, it was not limited to the war.78 It was to be maintained after
the war as well.79 To this point, Brandeis contended, “Unlike the
67

Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 327.
Id. at 33-34.
69 Id. at 326.
70 Id. at 331.
71 Id.
72 Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 332-33.
73 Id. at 334 (White, C.J., dissenting); Amanda G. Lewis, Federal Preemption of State and
Local Laws: State and Local Efforts to Impose Sanctions on Employers of Unauthorized
Aliens 7, (May 5, 2008) http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/careerservices/Federal%20Preemption%20of%20State%20and%20Local%20Laws.pdf.
74 Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 334 (White, C.J., dissenting).
75 Id. (White, C.J., dissenting).
76 Id. (White, C.J., dissenting).
77 Id. (White, C.J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
79 Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
68
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[F]ederal Espionage Act, [the Minnesota statute] applies equally
whether the United States is at peace or at war. It abridges freedom
of speech and of the press, not in a particular emergency, in order to
avert a clear and present danger, but under all circumstances.”80
Brandeis contended that such a statute affected everyone from
religious preachers, to school professors, to parents because it
prohibited them from speaking their beliefs on the subject or advising
young men whether or not to join the military. 81 The statute
prohibited those who had moral or religious convictions about
pacifism from teaching their beliefs to others.82
Upon passage of the Espionage Act in June 1917, two months
after Minnesota enacted its statute, Brandeis explained that the two
laws conflicted.83 Brandeis found that the Minnesota statute withheld
citizens’ rights to discuss their beliefs about enlistment and the war,
whereas the Espionage Act only prosecuted those who spoke words
that caused actual detriment to the United States war effort.84 He
argued that the degree of difference in these two policies was the
difference between maintaining homeland security and depriving
citizens of their constitutional rights.85
In conclusion, Brandeis made one last argument about how
the Minnesota statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. He
stated: “As the Minnesota statute is in my opinion invalid because it
interferes with federal functions and with the right of a citizen of the
United States to discuss them, I see no occasion to consider whether
it violates also the Fourteenth Amendment.”86 This final point in
Brandeis’ minority opinion set the stage for the case of Gitlow v. New
York,87 which would apply the freedom of speech to the states.88 The
Gilbert case is important to this study because it offered the first
opportunity for Brandeis to clarify his understanding of the freedom
of speech.89

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Feldman, supra note 21, at 208-10.
Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 334-35 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 335 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 336, 338, 340-41 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 335-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 336-37(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Wermiel, supra note 17, at 125-26.
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Id. at 666.
Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/12

10

Byron: A Progressive Mind

2017

A PROGRESSIVE MIND

205

On November 28, 1919, California authorities arrested Anita
Whitney for crimes under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act,
enacted on April 30, 1919.90 Whitney is the final case in this study
because it demonstrates the epitome of Brandeis’ influence on the
jurisprudence of free speech.91 In his judicial opinion, Brandeis
wrote eloquently about the scope of the First Amendment.92 In
Whitney, Brandeis solidified his understanding of the crucial role of
free speech in a political democracy.93
Unlike the previous two decisions, Anita Whitney’s arrest and
conviction took place in the post-World War I years.94 Yet,
California legislators enacted the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act as a direct result of the war.95 Following World War I, pockets
of communist groups formed throughout the United States.96
Americans identified this phenomenon as the Red Scare.97 The
majority of Americans, including state and federal government
officials, feared a revolution similar to Russia’s; therefore, individual
state governments instituted policies that made it illegal for citizens
to join organizations that advocated for revolutionary activity.98
In 1919, Whitney joined the Communist Labor Party of
California.99 Born into a well-known political family, the California
officials monitored Whitney’s political activity.100 After attending a
national conference held by the Communist Labor Party in
California, state officials arrested her for participating in an
organization that promoted radical revolutionary activity to
overthrow the current government.101 A county court convicted
90

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 360; H.R.M., Criminal Law: Criminal Syndicalism Act:
Constitutional Law: Validity of the Act under the Free Speech Clause, 10 CALIF. L. REV.
512, 512 (1922).
91 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 376-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
93 Id. at 373-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 360 (majority opinion); John Graham Royde-Smith & Dennis E. Showalter,
World War I, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I
(last updated Dec. 9, 2016).
95 Whitney v. California – The California Criminal Syndicalism Act, LAW LIBRARY –
AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION, http://law.jrank.org/pages/22799/Whitney-vCalifornia-California-Criminal-Syndicalism-Act.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2016).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 364.
100 Id. at 363-66.
101 Id. at 359.
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Whitney of criminal syndicalism.102 However, Whitney’s lawyer
appealed the case, arguing that the Criminal Syndicalism Act violated
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.103
On May 16, 1927, the Supreme Court ruled 9-0 in favor of
upholding Whitney’s conviction.104 Seven justices concurred with
Associate Justice Sanford’s opinion, but only Holmes concurred with
Brandeis’ opinion.105 Understanding the differences between the two
opinions makes Brandeis’ opinion read almost like a dissenting
opinion.
Sanford explained the importance of a writ of error.106 He
reinforced the concept that, according to division of powers in a
federal system, the United States Supreme Court was not to rule on
state cases that did not raise a federal question.107 Sanford pointed
out that Whitney’s lawyer had not raised a federal question originally
and, therefore, the case did not fall within the Federal Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction.108
While supporting Whitney’s conviction, Brandeis did not
agree with the full reasoning given in Sanford’s opinion.109 Brandeis
upheld Anita Whitney’s conviction because he agreed that her case
did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.110 Yet,
outside of the question of jurisdiction, Brandeis used his opinion to
express his deep thoughts and reflection about the scope of free
political speech.111
Brandeis found the California statute to be unconstitutional
because it went outside the bounds of an “imminent danger.”112
Imminent danger rested at the heart of his opinion.113 Brandeis
argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protected the fundamental right of free speech, but he acknowledged

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id. at 362.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 357, 372.
Id. at 359, 372, 380.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 362.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 380 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 374-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 377-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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that this right was “not in their nature absolute.”114 He explained that
the fundamental right of free speech was subject to restriction if it
was “intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some
substantive evil which the state constitutionally may seek to
prevent.”115
Basing this case law on the clear and present danger standard
of Schenck, Brandeis amended the ruling by changing the word
present to imminent.116 In doing so, he hoped to clarify the Schenck
standard.117 He agreed that free speech needed to be limited when
danger loomed in the face of these fundamental rights.118 The
impending threat of violence or injury to other United States citizens
overpowered a person’s right to speak.119 However, he contended
that when an imminent threat was not present, the First Amendment
protected all Americans in their right to speak freely on political
issues in a political democracy.120
To show his concerns about the jurisprudence of fundamental
freedoms, Brandeis harkened back to the American Revolution and
the Founding Fathers who created the Constitution in order to
demonstrate the historical significance of protecting American
freedoms.121 He wrote:
[The Founding Fathers] valued liberty both as an end
and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret
of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.
They believed that freedom to think as you will and
speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;
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Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 373-74 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
Id. at 373-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.122
In these powerful statements, Brandeis reminded readers of the
fundamental values that underlay the United States.123 He argued that
the Founding Fathers of the United States regarded free speech and
assembly as the means by which citizens could make their opinions
and concerns known.124 Without these freedoms, Americans would
be deprived of the rights that made the American Revolution possible
in the first place.125 He contended that free speech and assembly
were part of active citizenship.126 Most importantly, he noted that the
United States government was responsible for ensuring these
liberties.127
Brandeis provided support for his philosophy about the
Founding Fathers by quoting Thomas Jefferson’s first Inaugural
Address in which Jefferson declared, “If there be any among us who
would wish to dissolve this union or change its republican form, let
them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error
of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.”128
Brandeis followed this reference by explaining that the Founders
acknowledged the possible risks involved in free speech.129 He
continued:
[T]hey knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones. . . . Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the
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Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 375-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 375, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 374-75, 377-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 375 n.3 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Constitution so that free speech and assembly should
be guaranteed.130
Brandeis contended that fear of danger or harm that might
come of free speech was not enough for state and federal
governments to limit the fundamental rights of free speech of
American citizens.131 In his now famous quote, he stated, “Men
feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free
men from the bondage of irrational fears.”132 Brandeis made the
point that irrational fear, such as with witches in the Middle Ages,
resulted in the punishment and death of many innocent women who
did not have the ability to defend themselves.133 Brandeis argued that
free speech allows people to confront their fears and gain
understanding of other peoples’ perspectives.134 He explained that
the only circumstance in which free speech should be limited is when
a threat is clear and imminent.135 He stated, “[t]o justify suppression
of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.”136 The
remedy to counter offensive political speech, Brandeis asserted, was
more speech, not repression by public authorities.137
According to the power of judicial review decided in Marbury
v. Madison,138 Brandeis acknowledged that his role on the Supreme
Court was to interpret the Constitution according to how the framers
intended it to be understood.139 Brandeis argued, “if the Founders
rallied behind the shift from a British monarchy to a republic, then
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Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 376, 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
133 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring); Austin Cline, Persecuting Witches and Witchcraft:
Executing
Witches
and
Eliminating
Witchcraft,
ABOUT
RELIGION,
http://atheism.about.com/od/christianityviolence/ig/Christian-Persecution-Witches/WitchesHanging-Burning.htm (last updated Apr. 2, 2016).
134 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377(Brandeis, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
136 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
138 5 U.S. 137, 178-80 (1803).
139 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-78, 380.
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they would oppose the stifling of conflicting political beliefs at any
point in time.”140
Over forty years after Brandeis and Holmes handed down
their opinion in Whitney, the Supreme Court changed the standard
from clear and present danger to the imminently threaten standard in
Brandenburg v. Ohio.141 Although neither Holmes nor Brandeis
lived to hear the Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg, they
understood in their lifetime the importance of laying the foundation
for free speech jurisprudence. Brandeis’ earnest defense of free
political speech in the 1920s created the traction for the Supreme
Court to start grappling with the Founding Fathers’ understanding of
the First Amendment.142 The Supreme Court decisions in Gitlow and
Brandenburg drew upon Brandeis’ language and line of reasoning.143
The legal standards of incorporation and imminent threat demonstrate
that Brandeis played the key role in the shaping of the jurisprudence
for the freedom of speech.

140 Elizabeth Diane Todd, A Progressive Mind: Louis D. Brandeis and The Origins of
Free Speech 115 (Apr. 9, 2013) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Louisville),
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141 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
142 Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America’s “First
Freedom,” 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 560-63, 566 (1999).
143 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49; Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 671.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/12

16

